

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 04568

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL: SHAPE FOR INTAF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, GW, UK, US, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NUCLEAR ASPECTS: FRG REACTION TO WASHINGTON
TRILATERALS

REF: (A) BONN 4086, (B) BONN 18138

BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH AND
MBFR DEPT CHIEF RUTH TELL US THEY CONSIDERED
THE WASHINGTON TRILATERALS ON MBFR NUCLEAR ASPECTS TO BE
HIGHLY USEFUL. GERMANS FOUND TRILATERAL COMMON UNDER-
STANDING ON THE USE OF OPTION 3 TYPE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS
IN MBFR-I NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THE POINT THAT WARHEADS
INVOLVE FEWER PROBLEMS THAN DELIVERY SYSTEMS. ROTH
NOTED DIFFERENCES OVER DEGREE OF SOVIET PRESSURE FOR
INCLUDING NUCLEAR UNITS, SOVIET NUCLEAR OBLIGATIONS IN
MBFR AND, IN PARTICULAR, HOW TO HANDLE THE NUCLEAR
PROBLEM WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. ROTH ALSO COMMENTED ON
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AIR PERSONNEL/AIRCRAFT PROBLEMS AND ON THE MBFR/SALT

INTERFACE. FRG WILL NOW PROCEED WITH MORE DETAILED STUDIES OF MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES, TAKING US AND UK VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT. IN HIS COMMENTS TO EMBOFF BEFORE SECRETARY'S MARCH 21 PRESS CONFERENCE, ROTH SAID GERMANS STRONGLY FAVOR FURTHER TRILATERALS ON NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF MBFR. END SUMMARY.

1. ROTH AND RUTH HAVE DEBRIEFED EMBOFF ON THEIR MARCH 18-19 MBFR TRILATERALS IN WASHINGTON. BESIDES STRESSING USEFULNESS OF INTERCHANGES, THE GERMANS ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION TO ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS FOR THE COURTESIES EXTENDED TO THEM IN WASHINGTON. ROTH SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED THAT THERE WAS NO SPILL OVER OF THE CURRENT TRANS-ATLANTIC DIFFERENCES INTO THE MBFR AREA. HE SAID FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED UPON LEARNING FROM AMBASSADOR VON STADEN THAT, IN THE VIEW OF THE SECRETARY, THERE WERE NO PARTICULAR MBFR PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRG.

2. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS TREAT SPECIFIC NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF MBFR. SEPTELS COVER NPT, CCD AND MBFR VERIFICATION.

3. ROTH SAID THE TRILATERALS MADE CLEAR THAT THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN OPTION 3 OF THE APRIL 30 U.S. PAPER STILL CONSTITUTE THE BASIC AMERICAN APPROACH. ROTH SAID HE CONCURRED WITH THE U.S. VIEW THAT NUCLEAR ELEMENTS COULD BE USED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO PHASED APPROACH, AND MBFR-I FOCUS ON U.S./SOVIET GROUND FORCES, AS WELL AS REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY (INCLUDING TANKS) AND AGREEMENT TO THE WESTERN COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND END OBJECTIVE. ROTH SAID THERE WAS COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TANK/TACNUC MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH WAS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS BUT THAT THIS APPROACH SHOULD BE USED AS AN INSTRUMENT TO OBTAIN THE ABOVE WESTERN OBJECTIVES.

4. TURNING TO PARTICULAR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, ROTH SAID
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THERE WAS COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT WARHEADS WOULD NOT RPT NOT PRESENT .PARTICULAR MILITARY PROBLEMS BUT COULD POSSIBLY"BE PREJUDICIAL"REGARDING VERIFICATION. HOWEVER, ROTH NOTED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT FORESEE SPECIFIC MEASURES OF VERIFICATION IN THE WARHEAD CATEGORY. HE REMARKED THAT THIS INDICATED THERE WILL NOT BE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION FOR EACH ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT.

5. AS TO THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS, ROTH SAID THERE WAS COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT WITHDRAWAL OR REDUCTION WOULD PRESENT MORE OF A PROBLEM, BUT THERE WERE DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF

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THOSE PROBLEMS. ROTH HAD NOTED THE CLEAR U.S. VIEW THAT BRINGING WESTERN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS INTO MBFR VIS-A-VIS SOVIET TANKS WOULD NOT RPT NOT OPEN THE WAY FOR THE SOVIETS TO PRESS FOR THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR UNITS. WHILE THE U.S., UK AND FRG ALL AGREE THAT SUCH SOVIET DEMANDS MUST BE RESISTED, ROTH SAID THE BRITISH AND GERMANS ARE LESS SANGUINE THAN THE AMERICANS CONCERNING WESTERN ABILITY TO RESIST SUCH DEMANDS. AS WE REPORTED REF A, THE GERMANS ARE APPREHENSIVE CONCERNING SOVIET EFFORT TO "PENETRATE INTO ALLIED NUCLEAR UNITS AND AIR FORCES" IN MBFR. WHILE RUTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A GOOD CASE COULD BE MADE FOR APPROPRIATE MBFR REDUCTIONS IN WARHEADS, INCLUSION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS COULD IN THE GERMAN VIEW CREATE SERIOUS POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

PROBLEMS AND "AN INTENSE" DEBATE WITHIN GERMANY OVER
THE "SEQUENCE OF ESCALATION."

6. ROTH SAID CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES EMERGED AMONG THE
3 ALLIES ON POINT 6 OF THE ANGLO-GERMAN PAPER, NAMELY,
WHETHER COUNTER DEMANDS SHOULD BE MADE CONCERNING
SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES OR WHETHER WESTERN DEMANDS WOULD
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FOCUS ON TANKS AND OTHER ISSUES, THUS LEAVING THE
SOVIETS "A FREE HAND" ON THE MBFR NUCLEAR SIDE. ROTH
NOTED THAT THE FRG POSITION SEEMED TO FALL BETWEEN THE
U.S. PREFERENCE FOR A SOVIET TANK/U.S. TACNUC MIXED
PACKAGE (WITH NO COUNTER DEMANDS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR
FORCE) AND THE STRONG UK INSISTENCE ON NUCLEAR RECIPROC-
ITY. ROTH SAID THE FRG SAW SOME MERIT IN THE U.S.
APPROACH AS INSISTENCE ON RECIPROCITY MIGHT CREATE
PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF WESTERN QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS.
MOREOVER, SUCH A FORMULATION WOULD BE VERY GENERALIZED
AND MIGHT BE UTILIZED BY THE SOVIETS TO BROADEN THE
NUCLEAR DISCUSSION IN MBFR AND AS A LINK TOWARD ARGU-
MENTS FOR A TYPE OF DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN CENTRAL
EUROPE. HOWEVER, WHILE THE FRG COULD NOT RPT NOT
SUPPORT UK DEMANDS FOR STRAIGHT RECIPROCITY, BONN
BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE "SOME MEASURE OF
SOVIET OBLIGATION" IN THE MBFR NUCLEAR AREA IN ORDER TO
AVOID SERIOUS DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. IN THIS
CONNECTION, ROTH SAID THE GERMANS WERE THINKING IN TERMS
OF A SOVIET OBLIGATION NOT TO INTRODUCE NEW NUCLEAR
FORCES INTO THE NGA--I.E., PERHAPS SOME TYPE OF FREEZE
PROVISION. ROTH SAID THE GERMANS WOULD NOW ACCORD
FURTHER THOUGHT TO THIS PROBLEM AND HAD THE IMPRESSION
THAT, DESPITE THE STRONGLY STATED U.S. POSITION, HIS
ARGUMENTS AND THE STRONG FEELINGS OF THE BRITISH HAD
MADE SOME IMPRESSION ON U.S. OFFICIALS. IN ANSWER TO
EMBOFF'S QUESTION, ROTH SAID GERMAN (AND UK) INSISTENCE
ON SOME SOVIET MBFR NUCLEAR OBLIGATION WAS NOT MERELY
MATTER OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS BUT ALSO OF STRATEGIC AS
WELL AS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND DOMESTIC-POLITICAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS. ROTH EMPHASIZED THAT THE ABOVE REMARKS RELATED
TO MBFR I AND THAT A CONCEPT FOR MBFR II WOULD HAVE TO
BE DEVELOPED AT A LATER TIME, IN CONNECTION WITH ALLIED
CONSULTATIONS ON THE COMPOSITION OF MBFR II REDUCTIONS
AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

7. ROTH SAID THE MAJOR AND SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE OF
OPINION WAS ON HOW TO HANDLE THE MBFR NUCLEAR PROBLEM
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. (FYI - THIS CONVERSATION OCCURRED
BEFORE THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 21 PRESS CONFERENCE.) ROTH
SAID HE HAD FULL UNDERSTANDING FOR U.S. "HESITANCY"

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TO DISCUSS THE SENSITIVE MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE PREMATURELY GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS. ROTH HAD ALSO NOTED COMMENTS FROM SOME U.S. OFFICIALS THAT THERE ALREADY WAS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT OPTION 3 ELEMENTS COULD BE USED IN A MIXED PACKAGE TRADEOFF. ROTH SAID THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT STRONGLY DOUBTED THAT SUCH A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING EXISTED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HE SAID THE GERMANS AND THE BRITISH CONSIDERED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY IN VIENNA AND BRUSSELS IS, IN AND OF ITSELF, ONE OF THE MOST VITAL POINTS OF THE ENTIRE MBFR NEGOTIATION. ROTH EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE NUCLEAR QUESTION NOT BE PLAYED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BURDEN OR HAMPER THAT COHESION. IN THE GERMAN VIEW, NATO CONSIDERATION OF MBFR NUCLEAR ASPECTS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN NATO FORA SUCH AS THE SPC. HOWEVER, SOME MODALITIES SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO OBTAIN, AFTER SUFFICIENT DISCUSSION, NATO AGREEMENT AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL OF A COMMON ALLIED POSITION ON MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES. WHILE SUCH DISCUSSIONS NEED NOT GO INTO "ALL THE NUMBERS AND DETAILS," THE GERMANS (AND BRITISH) CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE

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OTHER ALLIES NOT GAIN THE IMPRESSION THAT"THEY HAVE
BEEN GIVEN THE RUSH ACT."

8. ROTH SAID THE FRG WOULD BE INCLINED TO ACCORD THE
LEAD TO THE U.S. ON TACTICAL ASPECTS OF MBFR
NUCLEAR ISSUES. HOWEVER, HAVING DISCUSSED THIS MATTER
AT LENGTH WITH JOHN THOMSON AND TICKELL, ROTH WISHED TO
RE-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THAT THEY ATTACHED TO THE
ALLIANCE COHESION ASPECT OF MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES.

9. ON AIR PERSONNEL AND AIRCRAFT, ROTH ESSENTIALLY
REITERATED THE POINTS IN REF A - PARAS 6 AND 7 - AND
SAID THAT THE GERMANS INTEND TO STUDY THESE ISSUES IN
FURTHER DETAIL. HE SAID A U.S. OFFICIAL HAD SPOKEN
INFORMALLY IN TERMS OF CONSIDERING AIRCRAFT AS A
SPECIFIC NUCLEAR ELEMENT RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF
AIRCRAFT PER SE. ROTH MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT LIKE
THIS APPROACH.

10. ROTH SAID THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE
SOME INTERACTION BETWEEN SALT AND MBFR BUT THAT THE
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PRECISE CHARACTER OF THE INTERFACE REMAINED UNCLEAR.
ROTH HAD NOTED A U.S. ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS SOME
ADVANTAGE TO TREATING AIRCRAFT AND PERSHING IN THE
LIMITED GEOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE NGA. HOWEVER,
ROTH WAS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED THAT THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE
SOVIET UNION LEVERAGE TO PRESS FOR (THEIR DEFINITION OF)
FORWARD BASED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OUTSIDE THE NGA IN THE
CONTEXT OF SALT. ROTH SAID MINISTER SCHEEL HAD NOTED
THE COMMENTS OF THE SECRETARY, MADE MARCH 3 TO HIM IN
BONN, CONCERNING MIRV AND U.S. POLICY IN SALT TWO. THE
MINISTER ALSO HAD NOTED THE SECRETARY'S INTENTION TO
DISCUSS THE FBS ISSUE FURTHER AND PERSONALLY WITH SCHEEL
SHOULD THE U.S. BE REQUIRED TO MODIFY ITS POSITION IN
SALT.

11. ROTH CLOSED BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE FRG FOUND THE
TRILATERALS TO BE HIGHLY USEFUL AND FAVORS FURTHER
TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF MBFR.
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